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Abstract: In the article a new explanation of basic 
level effect is presented. This explanation is given in 
terms of activation of particular concept in human 
semantic memory. In order to check the predictions of 
the proposed explanation the experiment was done. 
The main idea of the experiment was to give 
additional activation to the concepts that were not 
strongly activated before and to check whether they 
could show basic level effect in these new conditions. 
Experimental data could be interpreted as the 
evidence in support of the suggested explanation of 
basic level effect. 
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1. INTRODUCTION TO THE 
    PROBLEM 
People usually name objects they see at one 
particular level of abstraction. For example, they say 
"It's a chair", "It's a dog", but very rarely "It's 
furniture", "It's a fox-terrier". The categories that 
belong to this special level of abstraction are usually 
refereed to as basic level categories. The categories of 
higher level of abstraction are sometimes called 
superordinate categories, and the categories of lower 
level of abstraction are called subordinate categories.  
In present study our goal will be to compare the 
explanations of basic level effect given by two well-
known theories of categorisation: prototype and basic 
level theory and classical (Aristotelian) theory. 
From the point of view of prototype and basic-
level theory basic level is a very special level that 
plays important cognitive function. The theory states 
that “… there is generally one level of abstraction at 
which the most basic category cuts can be made. In 
general, the basic level of abstraction in a taxonomy is 
the level at which categories carry the most 
information, possess the highest cue validity, and are, 
thus, the most differentiated from one another.” 
(Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, &Boyes-Braem, 
1976: 383).  
Besides, the basic level categories possess some 
remarkable properties that could be taken as the 
operational definitions: members of a basic level 
category possess similar overall shapes; the basic level 
is the level of the most inclusive categories at which 
consistent motor programs are employed for all 
objects of a class; the basic level may be the most 
abstract level at which it is possible to have a 
relatively concrete image, etc. 
From the very beginning of basic level studies a 
special attention was paid to the role of perception and 
motor interaction with the world in selecting a special 
level of abstraction in a taxonomic hierarchy. Basic 
level was claimed to be “functionally and 
epistemologically primary with respect to the 
following factors: gestalt perception, image formation, 
motor movements” (Lakoff, 1987:13). “What 
determines basic-level structure is a matter of 
correlation: the overall perceived part-whole structure 
of an object correlates with our motor interaction with 
that object and with the functions of the parts (and our 
knowledge of those functions). It is important to 
realise that these are not purely objective and “in the 
world”; rather they have to do with the world as we 
interact with it: as we perceive it, image it, affect it 
with our bodies, and gain knowledge about it” 
(Lakoff, 1987: 50). In such a way, sensory-motor 
activity plays a crucial role in the determination of 
basic level, and, therefore, in the whole process of the 
formation of categories. 
Now let us turn to the explanation of basic level 
effect given by another popular theory of 
categorisation - classical (Aristotelian) one. Within 
classical approach we could think about basic level as 
about the level of categories to which we have only 
psychological preference that has nothing in common 
with the very process of categorisation. If the situation 
changes, the “basic level” also changes, but the 











level effect could be seen as an effect revealing the 
mechanism responsible for instructiveness rather than 
categorisation. Basic level effect is an effect on the 
system of categories. That’s why it should be 
explained from the prospect of how we use categories 
rather than how we form categories.  
For example, Jolicoeur proposed the notion of 
“entry point level” - “one particular level at which 
contact is made first with semantic memory” 
(Jolicoeur, Gluck, &Kosslyn, 1984: 272). In some 
cases “entry point level” coincides with so called 
basic level identified by Rosch et al. (1976), for 
example, in the case of typical birds. In some other 
cases “entry point level” is different (like, for 
example, in case of some atypical birds).  
Repeko (1998) proposed to use the notion of 
“bookmark” for explanation of basic level effect. 
According to him the categories that show basic level 
effects are “bookmarks” in our conceptual system. A 
“bookmark” is a special mechanism that is applied to 
the semantic memory. It provides a primary access to 
the “marked” concept within the memory. This 
mechanism was called “bookmark” by analogy with 
the real bookmark we could put in a book in order to 
facilitate access to the important or frequently used 
information.  
As a mechanism operating on semantic memory, 
“bookmarks” could facilitate the search of important 
information that could be crucial in “real-time” 
conditions of our life. The mechanism of “bookmarks” 
is dynamic and is bound to a particular level in the 
categorical structure, i.e., every concept could be 
“marked”. What was taken for the unique and 
cognitively privileged “basic level” is only a 
temporary “bookmark” that could be relatively easy 
shifted or added.  
“Bookmarks” as well as the “entry points” are 
mechanisms that are independent of the process of 
categorical division, they can work both on scientific 
and folk taxonomies. The number of used 
“bookmarks” is not restricted by any rules as well as 
their amount in one taxonomic chain. With the 
increase of importance of certain information it would 
tend to be “marked” for easier access (i.e., it will show 
basic level effect). This could be gained by the 
increase in expertise or by the explicit or implicit 
stress on the importance of information (for example, 
explicit claim that information is vitally important or 
impressive style that would convey implicit stress). 
The growth of expertise would result in a growth of 
necessity for faster access to more detailed 
information, i.e., to the shift of basic level effect to 
subordinate levels, while the growth of ignorance 
would make detailed information unnecessary and, 
thus, shift basic level effect to the superordinate 
levels.  
In such a way, the taxonomic structure of the 
conceptual system as well as categorisation 
mechanism is claimed to be independent from the 
process that is responsible for ‘basiclevelness’ of a 
category. "Basiclevelness" could be explained as a 
certain mechanism that temporary facilitates access to 
a certain place in the semantic memory. It could be 
seen as an effect of long-term activation of necessary 
information having nothing in common with the ways 
how this information was got. 
From this hypothesis it is possible to derive 
consequences that could be tested experimentally: 
 Any concept can be strongly activated, therefore, 
any category can show basic level effect under 
certain conditions. 
 Categories from different levels of abstraction 
may show basic level effect simultaneously even 
if one of them is genus and the other is species. 
Indeed, nothing prevents the concepts that 
correspond to such categories to be both highly 
activated. 
 Basic level could be easily shifted or added 
because the mechanism of activation needs to be 
quick and efficient to serve for the adaptation 
purposes of cognitive being. 
These consequences are in contradiction with the 
theory of prototype and basic level as it is presented, 
for example, in Rosch et al. (1976), Rosch (1978), and 
Lakoff (1987). Following the theory of prototype and 
basic level we have to accept that there is only one 
level of abstraction in the hierarchy of categories that 
is basic. Basic level can not be easily added or shifted 
(and it also cannot be context dependent) since it is 
characterised by the maximum amount of features that 
could be attributed to any member of a category. For 
any level of abstractness that is higher or lower than 
basic level the amount of attributes common for the 
members of a category is much less. Basic level cuts 
are made at “natural discontinuities” (Rosch, 1978: 
31) in the world and it is not in human power to shift 
or redistribute the natural discontinuities. “Human 
knowledge cannot provide correlational structure 
where there is none” (Rosch et al., 1976: 430).  
For example, if a table is a basic level category, it 
possesses many attributes common for all tables, 
while about kitchen table could be said very little new 
if we subtract the attributes common for all tables. 
According to basic level theory the category of 
kitchen table can not happen to be basic because it 
simply does not possess the sufficient amount of 
newly occurred attributes. Consequently, any learning 
about kitchen tables and different features of kitchen 
tables can not lead to the shift of basic level to this 












The prediction of prototype and basic level theory 
would be that learning some facts about kitchen tables 
or some properties of kitchen tables will not shift/add 
the category of kitchen tables to the basic level. On 
the contrary, if we assume that basic level effect is 
only the result of activation distribution it could be 
easily shifted and/or acquired.  
In this work we are going to check whether any 
category could show basic level effect under certain 
conditions, whether categories from different levels of 
abstraction may show basic level effect 
simultaneously even if one of them is genus and the 
other is species and whether basic level could be 
easily shifted or added because the mechanism of 
activation needs to be quick and efficient to serve for 
the adaptation purposes of cognitive being. 
The general idea of the experiment is to try to 
shift or add the categories that are at the subordinate 
level to the basic level, i.e., to show that under some 
conditions the categories that did not show basic level 
effect before could show it now. If this is possible, 
then basic level effect does not play any role in the 
process of categorisation but is a “measure of 
performance” (Gosselin&Schyns, 1997) - an effect 
that is unstable and could be easily manipulated.  
As the indicator of basic level categories the 
shortest response time in picture verification task was 
chosen. In picture verification task the subjects are 
presented with a word and then with a picture. The 
task is to decide whether the word is a correct name 
for the picture. 
If basic level effect is connected with the 
processes of activation it could be sufficiently easy 
shifted or added by the performing any task that 
requires deep semantic processing. Memory task was 
chosen as an appropriate one. Participants are to read 
and retell the story of previously not very well known 
to them object. This will activate the concept of the 
object in question at the level lower than it was before 
the task completion. This will add/shift a subordinate 
category to the basic level, i.e., the subordinate 
category will show basic level effect after additional 
activation.  
From the point of view of prototype and basic 
level theory, however, it is not so easy to add/shift a 
category from the subordinate level to basic. It is 
because “(1) in the received world, information-rich 
bundles of perceptual and functional attributes occur 
that form natural discontinuities, and that (2) basic 
cuts in categorisation are made in these 
discontinuities” (Rosch, 1978: 31). Since basic-level 
categories are already categories “that best mirror the 
correlational structure of the environment” (Rosch, 
1978: 31) it is difficult to explain what could cause the 
changes in distribution of basic level categories. It 
seems impossible to manipulate the correlational 
structure of the environment while to manipulate the 
activation of concepts in the conceptual system of an 




The experiment was modified after Rosch et al. 
(1976) object recognition task, Murphy&Brownell 
(1985), and Johnson&Mervis (1997) category 
verification task. In these experiments the participants 
were presented with a word and a picture. They were 
to answer whether the word names the picture 
correctly. The words were chosen at different levels of 
abstraction. Within-subject modification of this 
experiment was used. If basic level effect is only an 
effect of activation it could be shifted by the task that 
requires deep semantic processing. In other words, the 
category that did not show the basic level effect before 
may show it after additional activation. Our task is to 
see whether this will happen after the memory task - 
reading and retelling of the story about a particular 
object. 
Participants.  
The participants were 32 students from New 
Bulgarian University (Sofia, Bulgaria). All of them 
were native Bulgarian speakers. The subjects were 
paid for participation in this experiment. 
Materials.  
Colour pictures (naturalistic paintings or 
photographs) of different objects were digitised, 
edited, and presented on a colour high-resolution 
monitor. All pictures were presented against a white 
background in the middle of the screen. All of them 
were of the same size (10 cm 10 cm). Pictures were 
taken from two different domains - animals (insects 
and dogs) and artefacts (weapons).  
The names for the pictures were chosen at three 
different levels of abstraction. The names that 
supposed to be basic were chosen in the pre-test when 
a group of people (5-10 persons) was asked to name 
an object on the picture with the first name that comes 
to their mind. The most frequently generated name 
was taken as basic. The superordinate categories were 
chosen so that the members of these categories have 
very different shapes and that categories are familiar 
to Bulgarian speakers. The subordinate categories 
were chosen at the most specific level as possible.  
All stimuli that were used for the experiment are 
presented in the Table 1. In the first group there are 
three different basic level names while in the second 
and the third groups there is only one.  
Three groups of objects are taken to ensure the 
generality of the effect. In any experiment only the 











were used as a test group, the objects from two others 
serving for filler trials.  
In addition, 5 different pictures of the same size 
were prepared for practice trials.  
 
Table 1. 








 spider Рhalanx 
(Solpigides) 
insect  butterfly Vanessa Urticae 
 beetle  Cerambycidae 
1
 
  German Shepherd  
animal  dog  Staffordshire 
Terrier 
  Doberman Pinscher  
  katana 
weapon  sword china sword 
  two-handed sword 
 
Three stories were written about one object in 
every group. The stories were not very long (200-300 
words). Stories were printed on separate sheets of 
paper and include the modified (black&white and 
minimised) picture of the object in question. The 
stories contain different information about the selected 
object.  
Procedure 
Participants were told that they participate in two 
experiments. The first experiment is picture 
verification task and the second one is memory task. 
To do picture-verification task they need to perform 
the experiment twice.  
1
st
 stage of the experiment: picture verification 
task. First, the subjects are presented with the 
instruction. They are told that they will see a word on 
the screen of computer after which a picture appears. 
If they think that the picture is named correctly they 
are to press the button “YES” on the button box. If 
they think that the word does not name the picture 
correctly they are to press the button “NO” on the 
button box. The subjects are instructed to keep their 
index finger of a dominant hand on the button in the 
middle of the button box and use this finger for 
answers. After the performing the trial they should 
return the finger in the middle position. The 
participants are also instructed to do the task as fast as 
they can and as precise as possible because for the 
experiment the accuracy and the speed are both very 
important.  
                                                 
1
 Sorry for Latin, but I could not find folk English 
names. 
Trials are presented through PsyScope (Version 
1.0 for Apple Macintosh). Each trial is preceded by a 
short (250 ms) “ready” signal - a “+” in the middle of 
the screen. Then a word appears in the middle of the 
screen and remains there for a 2500 ms. Immediately 
following the word the picture is presented and 
remains on the screen until any appropriate key 
(“YES” or “NO” button) is pressed. Response time is 
recorded from the moment of picture presentation till 
one of the keys (“yes” or “no”) is pressed. The 
responses are stored with the response labels.  
The subjects were tested individually in an 
isolated booth. At first they were presented with the 
instruction followed by eight practice trials. Then they 
had the experiment, which consisted of 108 trials 
separated by a rest break in two blocks of 54 trials 
each. Eight practice trials included the names of the 
objects at different levels of abstraction: superordinate 
(plant, animal), basic (flower, monkey) and 
subordinate (salmon). The names for the pictures for 
practice trials were chosen in the same manner as for 
the stimuli presented in the Table 1. The words were 
followed by the picture that may or may not 
correspond to the name. None of the objects from 
practice trials appeared later in the test trials. After the 
practice trials the instruction was repeated and 
subjects were familiarised with the list of objects at all 
three levels of abstraction. This was done to reduce 
the amount of mistakes because the subordinate names 
of the presented objects were not very familiar to 
many subjects. Each word-picture pair was presented 
twice - before and after rest period. The word-picture 
pairs were presented at random order and the number 
of true trials was equal to the number of false trials. 
Each picture appeared on the screen 12 times. 
2
nd
 stage of the experiment: memory task. After 
the performing picture verification task the 
participants were asked to do the second experiment - 
memory task. They were given 10 minutes to read a 
text - a story about the selected object, then the text 
was taken away and the subjects were to retell the text 
in the written form. For the retelling the participants 
had as much time as they needed to complete the task.  
3
rd
 stage of the experiment: picture verification 
task. After the completion of the memory task the 
subjects were asked to do picture verification task 
again. The participants performed the same procedure 
as at the 1
st
 stage of the experiment except that they 
were not given the instructions and practice trials any 
more. In such a way, the participants saw each word-
picture pair four times. 
The experiment takes about 40-50 minutes. 
Participants were divided into three groups and 
each group performed the experiment with one of the 
stories. The first group performed the experiment with 










second group  - with the story about Staffordshire 
Terrier (13 people), and the third group - with the 
story about katana (10 people). 
 
Results and Discussion 
For all three groups of subjects similar results 
were obtained. That’s why we will present the joint 
analysis of all three groups of stimuli. Despite that the 
stimuli set contained some not very familiar items 
percent of correct responses was high: 96% correct 
answers for true trials and 96% correct answers for 
false trials. Only the correct responses for the true trial 
were used for statistical analysis. The items with 
response time that exceeded three times or more 
standard deviation were excluded from the analysis. 
For the analysis of the data STATISTICA 5.0 for 
Windows was used. 
For the comparison of data obtained during the 
first and the third stage of the experiment, i.e., before 
the reading and retelling the story about chosen object 
and after this task, 2-way ANOVA was done. The 
difference between the 1
st
 and the 3
rd
 stages of the 
experiment for the experimental sets of stimuli 
appeared to be statistically significant (see Fig. 1).  
LSD post-hoc test indicates that there is 
statistically significant difference between subordinate 
level before and after memory task (p<.0001) as well 
as between basic level before memory task and 
subordinate level after memory task (p<.015). Post 
hoc test shows also that after memory task the subjects 
answered as quickly at the subordinate level as at the 
basic level (p=.1068) and there was no significant 
difference between the response time at basic level 
before memory task and the subordinate level after 
memory task (p=.4066). 
Mean response times obtained in this experiment 
are higher than in Rosch et al.’s (1976) object 
recognition experiment, but lower than reported by 
Johnson&Mervis (1997). The difference may be due 
to the equipment used and to some differences in the 

















The data provide the evidence that the category 
that did not show basic level before (Phalanx, 
Staffordshire Terrier and katana) showed this effect 
after the memory task. Before the completion of 
memory task the chosen categories could not be 
counted as basic because the response time for its 
verification was significantly higher than for its 
superordinate category (genus). After the performing 
of memory task there is no statistically significant 
difference between the former subordinate category 
and basic-level category.  
Thus, in the beginning of the experiment (stage 1) 
a chosen category (Phalanx, Staffordshire Terrier, 
katana) could not be considered as basic because the 
verification time for it was significantly higher than 
for its genus. Therefore, this category could be 
considered only as subordinate. After the memory task 
that provided additional activation the category in 
question began to show basic level effect: its 
verification time became statistically equal to the 
verification time at the basic level, being actually less 
(the mean difference is 124 ms). If we think that the 
shorter verification time provides necessary condition 
for ‘basiclevelness’, then former subordinate category 
can be considered as ‘basic’, i.e., it shows basic level 
effect. Moreover, from the data obtained it is evident 
that the former subordinate categories that were 
activated have the shortest verification time. Although 
this time is not statistically much less than verification 
time for basic level categories, it is impossible to 
claim now that the objects “are first seen or 
recognised as members of their basic category (with 
additional processing required to identify them as 
members of their superordinate or subordinate 
category)” (Rosch et al., 1976: 412). It is evident that 
after memory task additional processing was required 
to recognise the objects at their initial basic level, 
while the objects were seen and recognised first at the 
level lower than before additional activation. 
The obtained results seem to be in agreement with 
classical theory. As it was predicted, the task that 
requires deep semantic processing provided additional 
activation for the concept of category that did not 
show basic level effect and made this category to 
show basic level effect. 
It is difficult, however, to explain the obtained 
experimental data from the point of view of prototype 
and basic level theory. It appeared that subordinate 
categories could be easily added to the basic level, 
while basic level categories also remain basic (in 
terms of verification time). Here the violation of the 
uniqueness of basic level happens. For example, the 
categories dog and Staffordshire Terrier show basic  
 




The main idea of the presented experimental 
study was the following: if some categories that are 
psychologically privileged (show basic level effect) 
due to the activation of the corresponding concept, 
then it is possible to take an arbitrary category, that is 
not psychologically privileged and make it 
psychologically privileged (show basic level effect) by 
additional activation. Memory task (retelling of the 
story about selected object) was chosen as the task 
that could provide additional activation. The results of 
the experiments could be interpreted in favour of 
classical theory. The categories that did not show 
basic level effect started to show it after the 
performance of memory task: the response time in 
picture verification task was significantly reduced. 
The obtained results, however, are not in agreement 
with prototype and basic level theory. Therefore, the 
experimental data could be seen as evidence in 
support of classical theory. 
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